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Abstract This paper presents the first investigation of whether direct democracy
supplements or undermines the attendance of demonstrations as a form of protest
behavior. A first approach assumes that direct democracy is associated with fewer
protests, as they function as a valve that integrates voters’ opinions, preferences, and
emotions into the political process. A competing hypothesis proposes a positive
relationship between direct democracy and this unconventional form of political
participation due to educative effects. Drawing on individual data from recent Swiss
Electoral Studies, we apply multilevel analysis and estimate a hierarchical model of
the effect of the presence as well as the use of direct democratic institutions on
individual protest behavior. Our empirical findings suggest that the political
opportunity of direct democracy is associated with a lower individual probability to
attend demonstrations.
Keywords Direct democracy  Protest behavior  Political participation 
Educative effect
Introduction
Public protests and direct political participation by means of direct democratic
institutions are two clearly related phenomena: Whenever there is increased protest
behavior, the call for more participation through direct democracy quickly follows.
Recent protests throughout Europe illustrate such reactions. Particularly in
Germany, ordinary citizens took to the streets in great numbers, protesting for
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instance against the infrastructure project ‘‘Stuttgart 21’’ or the nuclear waste
transport ‘‘Castor.’’ Similar developments can be found in Great Britain, where
protesters against retrenchments of higher education made the headlines, and in
France, where protests against pension reform were widespread (even by French
standards). In these instances it appears that the absence of institutions of direct
democracy led to alternative forms of participation such as protests and
demonstrations. Taking a ‘‘political process’’ or ‘‘political opportunity structure’’
perspective, direct democracy as a participatory decision-making institution
enhances the openness of a political system, helps integrate citizens’ preferences
and attitudes into the political process, and thus acts as a valve for potential protest
(Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986). Moreover, direct democracy fosters a deliberative
environment and provides a political discourse that discourages confrontational
strategies such as protests (Feld and Kirchga¨ssner 2000; Mutz 2006).
The reverse effect, however, is just as apparent: Whenever there are popular
votes, protests and demonstrations occur either in campaigns during the run-up to
the vote or as reactions to it. Several recent controversial initiatives illustrate this
effect: In Switzerland popular initiatives on the deportation of criminal foreigners
and on the ban on constructing minarets; in Germany (local) initiatives on school
reform and smoking bans in restaurants; and in California Proposition 8 on the
same-sex marriage ban and Proposition 19 on legalizing cannabis. All of these
direct democratic processes were accompanied by protests and demonstrations.
From a progressive perspective, this corresponds to the educative effect of direct
democracy that empowers citizens to get involved in the political process, enhance
their ability to form, express and enforce their preferences, and thus act as catalyst
for potential protest (Smith and Tolbert 2004).
Our paper evaluates the effect of direct democratic institutions on protest
behavior, putting both competing hypotheses to an empirical test. Given the strong
presence of protests in the recent public debate and the vigorous call for more direct
participation, it is astonishing that this relationship has yet to be investigated
scientifically. To date, no study exists that systematically links direct democratic
institutions with individual protest behavior. This is even more surprising when one
considers that the political opportunity structure approach was formulated in order
to explain protest behavior in the first place (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986). Ever
since the literature has investigated political opportunity structures for protests, it
commonly holds that the openness of a political system is a crucial determinant for
protests (Meyer 2004). Direct democratic institutions, however, are only mentioned
indirectly and not explicitly taken into account.1
To fill this gap, we test the relationship between direct democracy and protest
behavior at the individual level in the Swiss cantons. As most industrialized
countries do not or insignificantly apply direct democratic instruments, international
comparisons of the effects of direct democracy on protest behavior are difficult.
However, the Swiss cantons present a suitable alternative. These 26 sub-national
1 Kitschelt (1986, p. 68), for example, interprets referendums by anti-nuclear groups as a reason why
protest took on an assimilative form in the USA (as opposed to confrontational strategies in the closed
systems of France and West Germany). Kriesi and Wisler (1996) show that direct democracy in
Switzerland induces movements to use its instruments, thus moderating their action repertoire.
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units provide an excellent opportunity to test the impact of direct democracy—one
of Switzerland’s unique institutional arrangements. While some cantons witness
extensive use of direct democratic rights, reflecting a participatory political culture,
others are much more strongly oriented toward a purely representative democracy
(Vatter 2002). In methodological terms, Switzerland, with its more than two-dozen
cantonal units, offers many clear advantages: ‘‘Because the Swiss cantons are
entities within the same national political system, there are many characteristics
which they have in common, and which may therefore be treated as constants’’
(Lijphart 2002, p. 3). In this sense, the Swiss cantons are particularly well-equipped
to meet the demands of a most similar systems research design (Vatter 2002; Vatter
and Freitag 2007; Freitag 2006). Given that a real experimental situation cannot be
achieved in the context of our research question, the analysis of the Swiss cantons
can be seen as the best alternative available (e.g., Lijphart 1975; Przeworski and
Teune 1970, 31 et seqq.; Snyder 2001).2 Moreover, the 26 cantons represent a
sufficient number of contextual units for quantitative analysis (Jones 1997;
Steenbergen and Jones 2002).
The paper proceeds as follows: First, an overview of direct democracy in the
Swiss cantons is presented and the extent of individual attendance of demonstrations
is reviewed. Second, we discuss the theoretical considerations and hypotheses
regarding the relationship between direct democracy and protest behavior.
Following the presentation of the contextual and theoretical background, we
introduce the methodology and influencing variables and subject the various
hypotheses to the scrutiny of systematic statistical evaluation. The article concludes
with a brief discussion of the findings.
Direct Democracy and Protests in the Swiss Cantons
Switzerland has a long tradition of direct democratic participation and a
correspondingly wide array of direct democratic institutions on federal, cantonal,
and local levels. With regard to cantonal direct democracy, four different
institutions can be distinguished: the constitutional initiative; the legislative
initiative; the legislative referendum (in optional and mandatory form); and the
fiscal referendum (also in optional and mandatory form). In each canton each of
these institutions comes with different requirements that make it easier or more
2 We are of course aware of the fact that a sub-national analysis of Switzerland cannot completely
overcome the problems of analyzing the causal effect direct democracy has on protest behavior. While
internationally there are not any countries with a similarly high level of direct democracy as in
Switzerland, within Switzerland we do not have the fully counterfactual outcome, i.e., no direct
democracy at all (see Rubin 1974). Focusing on institutional configurations of direct democratic
instruments, some cantons exhibit very few opportunities of direct democratic participation and come,
compared to other cantons, very close to the counterfactual. Individuals in these cantons can therefore
serve as our—non-randomly assigned—control group (Achen 1986; Campbell and Stanley 1963).
Moreover, following King et al. (1995, p. 477) it is important for the evaluation of causal explanations in
political science to test a given hypothesis in different contexts and confront the respective findings.
Because previous research on direct democracy’s impact has largely focused on the U.S. states, adding
empirical data for the Swiss case can therefore be seen as a further step toward causal inference.
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difficult to influence political decisions according to the preferences of each citizen.
These requirements consist of the number of signatures needed, the respective time
periods allotted to launch initiatives and optional referendums, as well as the
financial threshold for fiscal referendums. Reviewing and comparing the require-
ments of each canton, several authors suggest an index of direct democracy that
combines all requirements into a single measure of institutional openness (Stutzer
1999; Stutzer and Frey 2000; Trechsel and Serdu¨lt 1999). Fischer (2009) extends
(and slightly amends) previous efforts to recent years and to all cantons (including
the three so called Landsgemeinden). On the other hand, a high presence of direct
democratic institutions does not necessarily imply an equally high use of them.
Although neither presence nor use can be viewed as entirely independent (Eder et al.
2009), they are not highly correlated with one another in the Swiss case
(Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter 2011). In fact, political elites in Switzerland are
assumed to be more responsive to citizens’ demands because they anticipate the use
of referendums and initiatives in those cantons which allow for a great deal of direct
democratic involvement. It could well be that both dimensions differ in terms of
their effects on protest behavior. Both the presence of direct democratic institutions
and the frequency of the use of initiatives and referendums are therefore taken into
account. Table 1 provides an overview of the presence and use of direct democracy
in the Swiss cantons for the years 1999–2003; Appendix Table 5 provides
descriptive statistics of the index and of the average of direct democratic votes. With
respect to institutional design and use of direct democratic instruments, the data
illustrates that the Swiss cantons exhibit marked variance in terms of formal legal
access to popular rights and their respective exercise.
Protest as ‘‘a conceptually distinct set of behaviors’’ (Eisinger 1973, p. 13) aimed
at political action can take on many different forms. In its broadest sense, protest
encompasses various unconventional modes of political participation—as opposed
to conventional modes like voting, campaigning, or contacting representatives. The
distinction between conventional participation and protest has been made starting at
the very early stages of research on political action.3 Many studies conceptualize
protest as the willingness of citizens to engage in dissent, such as demonstrations,
unofficial strikes, boycotts, petitions, occupation of buildings, and political violence
(Adrian and Apter 1995; Barnes and Kasse 1979; Marsh 1977; Opp and Kittel
2010).4 Noticing recent changes in action repertoires, Norris (2009, 639 et seq.),
however, points out that ‘‘demonstrations have become mainstream and widespread.
[…] Today, collective action through demonstrations has become a generally
accepted way to express political grievances, voice opposition, and challenge
authorities.’’ In this vein, following recent studies on protest behavior that employ
the terms ‘‘protests’’ and ‘‘demonstrations’’ interchangeably (Norris et al. 2005;
Norris et al. 2006; van Aelst and Walgrave 2001), we refer to the attendance of
3 Norris (2009, 639 et seq.), for instance, challenges these labels and suggests a new distinction ‘‘between
citizen-oriented action, relating mainly to elections and parties, and cause-oriented repertoires, which
focus attention upon specific issues and policy concerns, exemplified by consumer politics, […]
petitioning, demonstrations, and protests.’’
4 Eisinger (1973, p. 13), however, draws a clear distinction between political protest and more ‘‘costly’’
forms such, as political violence.
240 Polit Behav (2013) 35:237–260
123
demonstrations as protest behavior.5 As Table 1 shows, considerable variation
exists between the cantons regarding the percentage of respondents per canton who
attended a demonstration between 1999 and 2003. In some cases, variances of about
30 percentage points can be observed between the cantonal democracies. Because
Table 1 Direct democracy and protest in the Swiss cantons, 1999–2003
Canton Direct democracy
index 1999–2003
Direct democratic
votes 1999–2003
Participated in
demonstrations (%)
Number of
respondents
Geneva 1.75 6.4 23.7 600
Ticino 2.25 2.2 15.7 562
Neuchaˆtel 2.40 0.8 32.0 50
Vaud 2.42 3.4 20.9 647
Fribourg 2.79 1.8 14.6 90
Berne 3.02 2 25.3 561
St. Gallen 3.47 2.2 15.8 133
Zurich 3.50 8.6 17.2 634
Valais 3.58 0.6 19.1 84
Jura 3.71 0.4 18.5 27
Thurgovia 4.33 2.2 20.3 69
Basel-Town 4.40 3.4 19.6 56
Lucerne 4.42 3.6 9.5 613
Nidwalden 4.44 1.2 11.4 35
Zug 4.45 3.4 7.9 38
Obwalden 4.63 1.8 2.9 34
Grisons 4.83 9.8 2.9 35
Schwyz 4.94 3.6 2.7 37
Uri 5.13 3.2 3.7 27
Schaffhausen 5.17 3.2 10.3 662
Appenzell Outer Rhodes 5.20 2.6 17.5 40
Solothurn 5.25 5.2 8.5 71
Appenzell Inner Rhodes 5.41 2.4 10.8 37
Argovia 5.45 8 9.5 645
Basel-Country 5.52 8.4 20.8 72
Glarus 5.70 7.8 3.1 32
Average 4.16 3.8 16.0 5891
Swiss cantons ordered according to direct democracy score for the years 1999–2003; yearly calculations
by Fischer (2009). Direct democratic votes (popular initiatives and referendums) averaged per year for the
years 1999–2003. Percentage of participants in demonstrations indicate percentage of respondents who
answered ‘‘yes’’ to the questions in the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects 2003) questionnaire: In addition
to elections and popular votes, there are also other political activities. I read some of them to you. Please
tell me if you participated in each of these activities in the past five years. Attended a demonstration.
Average referring to total number of respondents, i.e., not weighted per canton
5 It has to be noted that our data from the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects 2003) does not include any
other items of the various forms of protest behavior mentioned above.
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individuals in the Swiss cantons vary substantially in terms of their propensity to
attend a demonstration, the question surfaces as to why these differences exist.
Theory and Hypotheses Regarding the Influence of Direct Democracy
on Protest Behavior
This article evaluates whether direct democracy increases or decreases individual
protest behavior. Viewed analytically, this inquiry forces us to take hierarchical
structures into account, as the assumption is posited that a macro-level condition
(direct democracy) is related to micro-level behavior (the decision to attend
demonstrations).
Theoretically, interactions with one’s social surroundings can shape individual
choices; however, an individual’s behavior can also be traced back solely to the
observation of one’s environment. A specific incentive offered by the individual’s
economic and socio-political surroundings can influence the individual to act in a
particular manner (e.g., Huckfeldt et al. 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987).6 From
the perspective of neo-institutionalism, political institutions have the ability to mold
individual preferences and stimulate or limit behavioral options by means of certain
incentive mechanisms (Dalton et al. 2009; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010;
Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Offe 2007).7 In
general terms, neo-institutionalism regards institutions not only as dependent but
also as independent variables (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, p. 43). While ‘‘classical
institutionalism is merely concerned with the description of political institutions and
their interrelationships,’’ in neo-institutionalism, institutions ‘‘are interpreted as
structural incentives for political actions,’’ thus shaping individual action (Kaiser
1997, p. 421).
How do these incentive mechanisms apply to the behavior of political
participation in particular? Verba et al. (1995, p. 15) invert the question of
participation and ‘‘ask instead why individuals do not take part in politics.’’ Their
answer is threefold: ‘‘because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because
nobody asked.’’ In this vein, we argue that institutional arrangements (namely,
direct democratic institutions) offer various channels of political participation by
providing resources (people can participate), enabling engagement (people want to
6 Institutions are of course the result of citizens’ collective action and may therefore be endogenous to
individual behavior over the long-run (Foweraker and Landman 1997). We argue, however, that
institutional arrangements can still be seen as exogenous framework conditions that cannot be changed by
an individual in the short and medium-run; instead, they influence individual preferences and behavior
patterns (see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, p. 1200).
7 This institutional approach is one of three accounts of protest behavior. Another approach centers
around people’s economic situations. If an individual personally experiences economic grievances, he or
she is likely to protest. In particular, relative deprivation is seen as the driving force for protest (Gurr
1970). Additionally, a cultural approach can be identified that challenges the rational cost-benefit analysis
of the economic view (Chong 1991). In that sense protest is a culturally inherited form of participation,
and cultural differences account for differences in political participation such as protests (Hofstede 1991).
In particular, the cultural resource of social (or interpersonal) trust is found to be associated with protest
behavior (Benson and Rochon 2004; Winters 2008; Valencia et al. 2010).
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participate), or facilitating opportunities (people are asked to participate). While the
insights of neo-institutionalism and civic voluntarism provide the basic logic of
institutional influence on political participation, they do not tell us the direction in
which the influence of direct democracy effectively works. With respect to the
influence of direct democracy on individual participation in demonstrations, two
competing hypotheses can be formulated.
The first approach assumes that a culture of extensive direct democracy
stimulates citizens’ propensity to participate in demonstrations (catalyst-hypothe-
sis).8 In this view, not every individual is capable of expressing his or her
preferences in the political process through unconventional participation. Without
knowing anything or caring about politics, without contact with like-minded people,
there is no reason why an individual should or could join protests. In fact, to engage
in protests individuals must meet several requirements: For example, they need to
have clear policy preferences—therefore they must have sufficient political
knowledge as well as interest—they should be politically efficacious, trust in
fellow protesters, and possess the ability to organize. All of these skills are
empirically linked to direct democratic institutions, which have, in particular, been
shown to exert an educative effect on their citizens (Matsusaka and Lupia 2004;
Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert and Smith 2005). Indeed, direct democratic
institutions are able to ‘‘stimulate participation by energizing citizens with a sense
of civic duty and political efficacy’’ (Smith and Tolbert 2004, p. 33). Simply
because an individual in a direct democracy is more frequently and immediately
exposed to political decisions than in a representative democracy, he or she is more
likely to be exposed to news media reporting on the decision, and is thus more likely
to learn about politics (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; Tolbert et al. 2003). The
individual is also more likely to be part of political discussions and to get to know
like-minded people, and consequently is more likely to feel efficacious in the
political process (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Bu¨hlmann 2007; a contrary is
however found by Dyck and Lascher 2009). Ultimately, the individual is more
likely to get involved and express preferences through protests. This empowering
effect of direct democracy on the expression of preferences becomes particularly
evident in the run-up to votes. Since decisions can be voted on by every individual
(instead of representatives), lobbying efforts are directed at the general public,
which is done best and most visibly through demonstrations. Again, the same
argument can be formulated by the civic voluntarism rationale (Verba et al. 1995).
People need resources, engagement, and to be recruited in order to be able to join
protests. In that sense the educative mechanism provides first ‘‘skills to use time and
8 This line of reasoning is in accordance with the views of the so-called ‘‘Progressive era reformers’’
(Smith and Tolbert 2004, p. 3). Here, direct democratic processes have an educative effect on the people
(Garner 1907; Bryce 1910; Weyl 1912). More recent studies of the USA provide empirical evidence for
positive effects on social participation (Tolbert et al. 2003; Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert and Bowen
2008; Boehmke and Bowen 2010) and conventional political participation through voting (Tolbert et al.
2001; Tolbert and Smith 2005; Tolbert and Bowen 2008; and more recently and specifically Dyck and
Seabrook 2010). Furthermore, mobilization effects on independent voters to cast their ballot (Donovan
et al. 2009) and positive effects on political trust (Smith and Tolbert 2004), as well as social trust (Dyck
2008), political knowledge (Tolbert et al. 2003; Schlozman and Yohai 2008), and political support
(Bu¨hlmann 2007) can be shown.
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money effectively’’; second ‘‘interest in politics,’’ ‘‘concern with public issues,’’ ‘‘a
belief that activity can make [little or no] difference,’’ and ‘‘knowledge about the
political process’’; and third ‘‘networks [of recruitment] through which citizens are
mobilized to politics’’ (Verba et al. 1995, p. 16). Put differently, in direct
democracies people can protest, they want to protest, and they are asked to protest.
From these assessments, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The higher the degree of direct democracy, the more likely it is that
an individual will participate in demonstrations.
The antithesis to these essentially positive conjectures would then suggest a
negative relationship between direct democracy and protest behavior (valve-
hypothesis). According to this approach direct democratic institutions are conceived
as components of a particular structure of political opportunities (Eisinger 1973;
Meyer 2004). Referring to Kitschelt (1986, p. 58), ‘‘political opportunity structures
are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and
historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of
protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.’’
In this view, individuals possess policy preferences that they wish to see
implemented. Therefore, they consider their repertoire of means to participate in the
political process and to influence political decisions according to their preferences.
Participatory institutions, such as direct democracy, channel the relationship
between individuals and government, providing an environment that makes protests
less likely. First and foremost, direct democracy as a participatory decision-making
institution enriches the range of conventional political participation. If many
opportunities for participation are offered, the political system is considered to be
open to the input of preferences. Direct democracy therefore, represents political
opportunity structures for conventional participation. Individuals will then use these
institutions to influence political decisions (e.g., by popular initiatives or referen-
dums) rather than embracing unconventional forms such as demonstrations: ‘‘In a
highly open system, on the other hand, where government is not only responsive but
anticipates needs and meets them, […], protest will be unnecessary. In an open
system, groups have easy access to decision makers without resort to the drama of
protest.’’ (Eisinger 1973, p. 28).9 In the same vein, Kitschelt (1986, p. 66) argues:
‘‘when political systems are open and weak, they invite assimilative strategies;
movements attempt to work through established institutions because political
opportunity structures offer multiple points of access. In contrast, when political
systems are closed and have considerable capacities to ward off threats to the
implementation of policies, movements are likely to adopt confrontational,
disruptive strategies orchestrated outside established policy channels.’’ In this
regard, in direct democracies individuals can participate—in addition to elections—
in other conventional forms through popular initiatives and referendums because
they are asked to vote; hence, they don’t want to participate in unconventional forms
9 Eisinger (973, 27 et seq.) hypothesizes in fact a curve-linear relationship between openness of
government and protest. In extremely closed systems, protest would be neither a viable nor a fruitful
strategy. Arguably, however, such an authoritarian system that suppresses protests is not to be found in
the Swiss context.
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such as demonstrations. On the other hand, without direct democratic institu-
tions people can’t participate conventionally, and thus will want to do so
unconventionally.10
In addition to this valve mechanism, direct democracy also fosters a more
deliberative culture (Feld and Kirchga¨ssner 2000). Kriesi and Wisler (1996, 37 et
seq.) state in this respect that ‘‘availability of direct-democratic institutions
contributes to the ‘civilization’ of political conflict.’’ In this sense, it is not only
actual use of direct democratic institutions that renders protest behavior unneces-
sary, but also the particular political environment of direct democracy. For instance,
political elites in direct democracies are assumed to be more responsive to citizens’
demands because they anticipate the use of referendums and initiatives. The mere
presence of the institutions therefore provides an incentive for political elites to act
responsively and make decisions closer to the median voter (Hug and Tsebelis
2002). Or as Mutz (2006, p. 3) points out, direct democracy may help develop a
more deliberative, tolerant, and respectful environment while participation and
political activism decline. Here, the presence of direct democratic institutions
creates a deliberative atmosphere that discourages confrontational strategies such as
protests. Taken together, the discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The higher the degree of direct democracy, the more likely it is that
an individual will abstain from participating in demonstrations.
Data, Methodological Approach, and Variables
In the following section, we test the derived hypotheses empirically. The dependent
variable is the reported individual participation in demonstrations (see Table 1).
These data were obtained from the 2003 Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects),
specifically from responses to the following question: ‘‘In addition to elections and
popular votes, there are also other political activities. I read some of them to you.
Please tell me if you participated in each of these activities in the past five years.
Attended a demonstration.’’ Being part of the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES) network, the Selects study was conducted through computer
assisted telephone interviews (CATI) immediately after the Swiss National Election
in October 2003. The response rate was 73.3% (Selb and Lachat 2004, p. 34). The
final sample consists of 5,891 individuals in the 26 Swiss cantons.
We test the competing hypotheses about the effect of direct democracy on protest
behavior in the context of the Swiss sub-national entities. In analytical terms, the
Swiss cantons meet the requirements of a most-similar cases design: They exhibit a
substantial degree of similarity with respect to consolidated structural elements and
they differ considerably regarding the configuration of direct democratic institu-
tions, as Table 1 shows (Fischer 2009; Stutzer 1999; Stutzer and Frey 2000;
Trechsel and Serdu¨lt 1999). It is therefore potentially less difficult to create ceteris
10 While only a special one, the most evident case would be when individuals protest against insufficient
opportunities of participation or against representatives and their decisions. In direct democracies, on the
other hand, such protest is not found (Opp 1996, p. 230).
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paribus conditions for a systematic comparison of cantonal systems than for a cross-
national comparison, since the cantons have many characteristics in common that
can be treated as constants (Freitag 2005; Lijphart 2002; Vatter and Freitag 2007).
As indicated by the research question, we are dealing with hierarchical data
structures, i.e., individuals nested within institutional contexts that are thought to
exert an influence on them. We therefore apply random-intercept models, implying
that individual behavior can vary between cantons (Jones 1997; Steenbergen and
Jones 2002). Additionally, such a multilevel model allows for the modeling of
macro-level characteristics (in the present case, the direct democratic context) that
account for the variance at the macro-level (the variance between cantons). As the
dependent variable is dichotomous, individual participation in demonstrations is
transformed to a logit structure.
For the purpose of explaining individual participation in demonstrations, we
integrate contextual as well as individual characteristics into the analysis. We use
the values of the contextual factors measured prior to or throughout, but not after,
the reported participation in demonstrations to assure that the potential cause
precedes the effect.11 In order to measure the presence of direct democracy, we use
an index developed by Fischer (2009) as our explanatory variable (see Table 1;
Appendix Tables 4 and 5). First suggested by Stutzer (1999), this index combines
degrees of openness for each of the four direct democratic institutions: the
constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, the legislative referendum, and the
fiscal referendum. Values between one and six reflect the legal requirements for
each institution in terms of required signatures, time period to collect signatures, in
the case of the legislative referendum, whether it is optional or mandatory, and for
fiscal referendums, the financial threshold. The resulting four sub-indices are
averaged into one index. In other words, some cantons require many signatures,
offer only a short time period in which to collect them, do not have a mandatory
(only an optional) legislative referendum, and a high financial threshold. Such
cantons thus exhibit high legal requirements and score low (i.e., close to one) on the
index of direct democracy. Cantons with low legal requirements score high (i.e.,
close to six).12 From the discussion above, it follows that direct democracy also
includes another dimension different from the mere institutional presence. We
measure the use of direct democracy by averaging the number of all cantonal
initiatives and referendums per year (Anne´e politique Suisse). We test both
instances of direct democracy separately to ensure a comprehensive account of
direct democracy and to strengthen our empirical investigation.13
However, as other theoretical arguments claim, there are several alternative
explanations as to why people protest that vary systematically across and within
cantons. We analyze the effect of direct democratic institutions while holding other
factors constant, thereby ruling out spurious relationships. As mentioned above, in
addition to our institutional perspective, there are important individual characteristics
11 Moreover, one can argue logically that it is the more stable (‘‘sticky’’) contextual condition, which
causally affects the more volatile (‘‘loose’’) individual behavior, and not vice versa (Davis 1985).
12 Coding for thresholds and corresponding index points is described in detail by Stutzer and Frey (2000).
13 We are grateful to our anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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that contribute to protest behavior. We base our selection of variables on the prominent
models in the protest literature.14 Protest participation can be explained by a number of
different theories: by grievance theory (Gurr 1970), by a specific set of political values
(Inglehart 1990), or more comprehensively, by the aforementioned civic-voluntarism
model (Verba et al. 1995). From the relevant literature we derive individual variables
that are commonly associated with increased protest behavior (e.g., Benson and
Rochon 2004; Norris et al. 2005). In general, men, younger people, and people with
higher education are assumed to protest more.15 The same applies to more trusting
persons and persons with more post-materialistic values as well as a left-leaning
ideology. We also consider people who favor a green party, are members in a labor
union, or are employed in the agricultural sector as more likely to protest because they
represent the most prominent protest groups in Switzerland. To sum up, the variables
sex, age, education, trust in others, post-materialism, ideology, green party attach-
ment, union member, and agricultural profession are generated from the same 2003
Selects data set and included in the analysis.
Similarly, we account for alternative explanations on the contextual level. It
could be the case that the variation in protest behavior is only due to systematic
differences in protest related factors between cantons. Therefore, we selected
control variables identified in the relevant literature as potentially influential to
protest behavior on a contextual level (e.g., Winters 2008). In this sense, people
living in more affluent and urban cantons are thought to have more opportunities to
protest and are thus more likely to do so. Furthermore, protest should be more likely
where social movements have been strong and successful. Historically in
Switzerland, traditional social movements are strongly tied to labor issues and
unions (Hutter and Giugni 2009). New social movements are strongly tied to
environmental issues and the success of green parties (Kriesi 1982; Zwicky 1984,
p. 105). Moreover, when considering major protest events (with more than 1,000
participants) we find a highly uneven distribution: by far most protest events take
place in Berne, Zurich, and Geneva. Since the costs of participation decrease as the
distance between the protester’s home and the protest decreases, we include the
distance to these cities as a control variable.16 Finally, people in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland are thought to be more likely to protest than people in
the Latin language areas. These language regions have shown to be important
factors in Swiss politics, as they coincide with different concepts of democracy
(Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010, p. 477). Moreover, language regions are not
only correlated with the extent of direct democracy, but residents also generally
differ in terms of political culture and, in particular, with regard to their perceptions
14 For an overview see for example Dalton et al. (2009) or Opp (1996).
15 Level of education is highly correlated with personal income, but the latter contains more missing
values. To avoid multicollinearity and to keep as many observations as possible, we use the level of
education in our analysis.
16 We use data of protest events between 1999 and 2003 with at least 1,000 protesters (Anne´e politique
Suisse). In addition, there exists a highly significant and strongly negative effect (b = -11.4; SE = 3.3)
of direct democracy on the number of major protest events in the Swiss Cantons (n = 26), even after
introducing our (contextual) control variables (R2 = 0.58). In other words, the extent of direct democracy
is related to fewer protest events in the Swiss cantons.
Polit Behav (2013) 35:237–260 247
123
of representative and direct democracy. Whereas the German-speaking cantons
mainly display an extensive degree of direct democracy, French and Italian-
speaking cantons offer only restrictive access to direct democratic instruments and
are more oriented toward a representative model of democracy (Stadelmann-Steffen
and Freitag 2011, p. 535).17 Altogether, the contextual variables primary national
income (i.e., income of all households) per capita, urbanization, share of union
members, strength of green parties, distance to major protest city, and share of
German-speaking population are generated from official statistics and included as
controls. More detailed information about the variables (their operationalizations
and data sources) can be found in Appendix Tables 4 and 5 presents descriptive
statistics of all variables.
Empirical Findings
In this section we present a two-stage procedure to examine the relationship
between the direct democratic context and an individual’s participation in
demonstrations. Some preliminary analyses demonstrate that individual participa-
tion in demonstrations systematically varies between the cantons, even when
controlling for individual variables (Table 2). Apparently, there are contextual
differences that affect protest behavior, which confirms that it is not only
theoretically, but also methodologically appropriate to model a contextual effect of
direct democracy on individual protest behavior. Moreover, the introduction of the
(contextual) direct democracy variables greatly reduces contextual variance. The
independent variables of the presence and use of direct democracy therefore
explains a substantial part of protest variance between cantons. In particular, the
presence of direct democracy (2) is able to reduce context variance as well as
intraclass correlation almost to zero.
Now that we have established that direct democracy does exert an influence on
protest behavior, we must now inquire into the direction of the effect and whether it
holds under controlling factors. To answer these questions we turn to results of the
Table 2 Random effects of protest behavior
Empty
model
Individual
model (1)
Direct democracy
model
Direct democracy
model
Presence (2) Use (3)
Context variance 0.229 0.203 0.059 0.180
Intraclass-correlation 0.065 0.058 0.018 0.052
-2 9 log likelihood 5070.69 3806.80 3793.86 3803.44
17 In this respect, Ladner (2007) finds both a greater number and increased importance of local
parliaments in French and Italian-speaking cantons than in German-speaking cantons. Knu¨sel (1994)
argues that language regions are influenced by their respective neighboring countries: The representative
model of democracy in Italy and France delegates responsibility and power away from the individual to
the unitary state. In German-speaking cantons, on the other hand, citizens embody the idea of a ‘‘small’’
state and are thus left with more power and responsibility.
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above specified random-intercept logit model. In the next analytical step we present
the basic model containing the degree of direct democracy and individual controls.
We then add the controlling contextual variables to expand the model (Table 3).
The main results can be described as follows:
• First and foremost, with regard to our main hypotheses, the estimations seem to
confirm the negative effect of direct democracy on protest behavior. In other
words, we can observe a trade-off between cantonal direct democratic culture
and individual participation in demonstrations: The higher the degree of direct
democracy, the greater the likelihood that an individual will abstain from
participating in demonstrations. Most notably, this is true for both dimensions of
direct democracy: its presence as well as its use. We find no support for a
positive, educative effect of direct democracy in Switzerland; rather, a strong
direct democratic culture is associated with decreased participation in demon-
strations, all other things held constant. In both estimations, controlling for
individual and contextual factors, this effect is highly significant. Again,
institutional presence and the use of direct democracy are able to explain a fair
amount of the variance of protest behavior. Results in Table 3, however, are
difficult to interpret in terms of effect size. For that reason we calculate
predicted probabilities to engage in protest given the degree of direct
democracy. Figure 1 shows the relationship and corresponding confidence
intervals, with controlling covariates fixed at their means. Under these
conditions, the probability of attending a demonstration decreases from 18.5%
in the canton with the fewest direct democratic institutions to 6.5% in the canton
with the most direct democracy (Graph on the left). This is a reduction of
roughly 65%. Interestingly, size of the effect is the same going from the canton
with the least use (18.1%) to the canton with the highest use (6.6%) of direct
democracy (Graph on the right.). That means direct democracy in Switzerland
reduces the probability of protesting by nearly two-thirds.
• Second, most of the individual control variables are significant and perform in
the theoretically hypothesized direction. A higher likelihood to protest is
associated with younger age, higher education, more post-materialist values,
attachment to a green party, left ideology, union members, greater trust in
others, and agricultural professions. These relationships remain significant after
introducing contextual control variables.18
• Third, with regard to the contextual controls, results of the use and the presence
of direct democracy are somewhat ambiguous. In the slightly improved model
(4), a canton’s percentage of labor union members in the work force has a
significant effect. Like the respective individual control for union membership,
individuals in cantons with a high share of union members are more likely to
protest. Marginally significant, the share of the German-speaking population is
18 In analyses not documented here, we tested further individual variables that could be connected to
protest behavior, namely variables for political trust and political knowledge. These variables are not
significant in our model, do not change the model estimates, and are therefore excluded. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3 Random-intercept logit models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual model Direct democracy models Full models
Individual effects
Constant -0.70** 0.38 -0.40 -1.24* -1.82*
(0.29) (0.36) (0.33) (0.70) (1.00)
Age -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sex -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Education 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-materialism 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Green party attachment 0.48** 0.47** 0.48** 0.48** 0.47**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
Left–right placement -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Union member 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.89***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Trust in others 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Agricultural profession 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.68***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Contextual effects
Direct democracy presence 20.27*** 20.30***
(0.06) (0.08)
Direct democracy use 20.08* 20.12***
(0.04) (0.04)
Share German speaking 0.43* -0.06
(0.25) (0.26)
Urbanization -0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
National income 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Share union members 0.05*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Green party strength 0.05** 0.07**
(0.02) (0.03)
Distance to major protest city -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Random effects
Context variance 0.20 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.02
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also positively associated with a higher likelihood of protesting. Significant in
both models (4 and 5) is the effect of the strength of Green parties: Individuals
are more likely to protest where Green parties are stronger. Although the
distance from the cantonal capital to the closest major protest event,
urbanization, and national income are not significant, these variables represent
important controls and are therefore left in the model.19
Of course, the results of the full models (4 and 5) require further testing. As we
are dealing with a very small number of cases, level-two units (here, cantons) can
quickly exert a large influence on the estimation of the parameters. Regression
diagnostics were developed to measure various ways in which a regression relation
might be largely dependent on one or two observations. Particularly in small
samples, there is the danger that the results achieved might be dominated by a few
observations, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of a regression estimate and
the conclusions made thereupon. Therefore, we re-estimated our model multiple
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Direct democratic votes per year 1999-2003
Predicted probability "to attend a demonstration"
95% confidence interval
Fig. 1 Predicted probability of attending demonstrations. Note: The graph on the left shows predicted
probability given the presence of direct democracy (based on model 4); the graph on the right given the
use of direct democracy (based on model 5). Control variables are set to their means
Table 3 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual model Direct democracy models Full models
-2 9 log likelihood 3806.80 3793.86 3803.44 3784.42 3779.94
N/n 5,169/26 5,169/26 5,169/26 5,169/26 5,169/26
Bold values refer to the independent variables of direct democracy
Standard errors in parentheses *** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
19 We also tested further contextual indicators of our individual variables, namely variables for age
distribution and education pattern per canton. Again, these variables are not significant in our model, do
not change the model estimates, and are therefore excluded. Moreover, further analyses of potential cross-
level interactions between direct democratic settings and individual accounts of protest behavior (not
presented here) do not show significant effects, and thus do not support the educative reasoning. These
results are available from the authors upon request.
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times, each time excluding a single canton (and its respondents). Although this kind
of manual jackknifing represents a strict test for influential cases (excluding in some
cases several hundred observations), the direct democracy variable remains
significant in all 26 separate models. Figure 2 illustrates the direct democracy
coefficients in the 26 separate models to the exclusion of a single canton. Even
without the most influential canton Berne (and the capital of Switzerland), we find
that the confidence interval do not include zero. Furthermore, we also applied a
jackknife estimation of standard errors, which also resulted in significant
coefficients for direct democracy. Based on these results, we are fairly confident
about the present findings.20
Conclusion
This paper began with the observation of two seemingly contradictory trends in
current events. On the one hand, increased protest activity is accompanied by a call
for more direct democratic participation. On the other hand, direct democratic
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Schwyz
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Glarus
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Fribourg
Solothurn
Basel-Town
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Schaffhausen
 Appenzell Outer Rhodes
Appenzell Inner Rhodes
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Argovia
Thurgovia
Ticino
Vaud
Valais
Neuchâtel
Geneva
Jura
-.6 -.4 -.2 0
Coefficient Presence
95% confidence interval
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Fig. 2 Effect of direct democracy to the exclusion of respective canton. Note: The graph on the left
shows coefficients and confidence intervals for the presence of direct democracy (based on model 4)
excluding single cantons; the graph on the right show the use of direct democracy (based on model 5)
20 Although our empirical results clearly favor the hypothesized negative relationship, they do not clarify
the mechanism: is the decline in protest behavior due to the deliberative environment of direct democracy
or is it because citizens use direct democratic votes as a valve? As evidence for the valve effect, the
degree of direct democracy should also be positively correlated with individual participation in popular
votes. In further analyses of the same models (not documented here), the direct democracy variable
indeed exerts a highly significant and positive effect on individual participation in popular votes. These
results are available from the authors upon request. With this in mind, our results seem to support the
argument that direct democratic institutions indeed act as valve. As we detail below, however, more
empirical investigation is needed to scrutinize the underlying causal mechanism.
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decisions are every once in a while accompanied by protests. Given these
observations, we tested the direction of the effect of direct democratic institutions
on protest behavior. Do they act as valve, integrating preferences and emotions into
the political process and thus rendering protests unnecessary? Or do they catalyze
preferences and emotions by empowering citizens to engage and thus stimulate
protests in the first place? Surprisingly, no systematic empirical evaluation of this
relationship had been undertaken. In fact, theoretically, strong cases for both
arguments can be made. Our contribution juxtaposes both arguments and further
develops their theoretical foundations. To arrive at an answer, however, we model
the relationship and test it empirically in the context of the Swiss cantons. Here the
result is clear: Direct democratic institutions significantly reduce protest behavior.
The effect is not only significant when controlling for individual and contextual
effects, but is also substantial in its size. Direct democratic institutions seem to be
able to act as political opportunity structures. They provide people with institutional
means of participation and decision-making. Consequently, citizens do not feel the
need to protest their causes. Viewed the other way around, if direct democratic
institutions are absent, people lack the opportunity to participate conventionally, and
thus see no other option than to engage in protests.
Regarding the varieties of neo-institutionalism (historical, sociological, and
rational-choice perspectives), which differ in how they define institutions in detail,
the methodologies they use, and on how institutions shape actors’ preferences (e.g.,
Hall and Taylor 1996; Sørensen and Torfing 2007), our data do not however allow
us to differentiate between the different schools of thought in our analysis.
Nevertheless, according to some prominent Swiss scholars, there is at the very least
some evidence that in Switzerland, direct democracy is indeed a deeply rooted trait
that is culturally inherited by the cantons and their citizens. These scholars
emphasize the extent to which individuals turn to established routines or familiar
patterns of behavior to attain their purposes (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2005;
Vatter 2002). This account reinforces the abovementioned findings about language
regions, democratic institutions, and democratic culture by Ladner (2007) and
Knu¨sel (1994). Apparently, there is a fundamental relationship between the type of
democracy and the appreciation of direct democracy in a canton. While in more
direct democratic, German-speaking cantons people tend to think that popular votes
have a greater influence on politics than elections, in the French and Italian-
speaking cantons, which are much more oriented toward a purely representative
model of democracy, people do not support this view.21
Overall, our analysis of the effects of direct democracy on protest behavior
contributes to and enriches the global dialogue on the introduction of direct
21 With regard to other cantonal idiosyncrasies, it could also be that it is not direct democracy per se that
reduces protests, but rather that direct democratic cantons are more likely to pass laws that make protests
unnecessary—for example by recognizing minority rights. In order to rule out such indirect effects we
correlate the direct democracy measure with data on cantonal recognition of religious minorities by
Christmann (2010, p. 21). We find an insignificant and low (0.2) correlation, indicating that direct
democratic cantons are not more likely to pass laws that effectively reduce or suppress protests.
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democratic procedures (Scarrow 2001). From a normative point of view, it could be
concluded from our results that extending direct democratic institutions is desirable.
Lowering institutional barriers for direct democratic action is a means to reduce
protests and demonstrations and to foster a deliberative discourse. In this regard, we
confirm Kriesi and Wisler’s (1996, 37 et seq.) statement that direct democracy is
able to civilize political conflict. We must, however, underscore that our results are
only suggestive and explorative. Although they are a step in the right direction, we
need more investigations that empirically scrutinize the causal mechanism between
direct democracy and protest behavior in order to provide a more confident base if
we indeed wish to speak of a causal relationship. Complementary to our quantitative
analysis, qualitative studies are needed to confirm the causal mechanism that our
cross-sectional design merely assumed and tested. This certainly is a limitation of
our study that we would like to address in future research.
Additionally, the general problem of how to approach the arguments presented in
a comparative perspective remains. Although the Swiss cantons differ in terms of
local democracy, Switzerland in general has a long tradition in direct democratic
practice. Together with its unique parliamentary model, it has developed a
consensus oriented spirit that allows for a very deliberate exercise of direct
democracy. This is probably necessary to make actual use of it as opportunity
structure. We therefore need to acknowledge the socializing potential of direct
democracy. Put differently, socialization in direct democracies allows citizens to
perceive direct democratic institutions as political opportunity structures in the first
place. In a completely different context, however, the introduction of direct
democratic instruments could—at least initially—still lead to catalyzing effects. For
this reason, we need to further investigate the ‘‘mutual’’ relationship of direct
democratic institutions and deliberative democratic culture (Foweraker and
Landman 1997), as well as study the effect of direct democratic institutions on
protest behavior in other contexts. In the same vein, international comparison of this
effect would be recommended. At present, an empirical analysis of this kind at the
national level appears nearly impossible, as there are but a scant handful of
comparable cases. Against this background, the tendency in western democracies to
redesign institutions in ways that give citizens more opportunities to exercise direct
control over political decision-making may provide new prospects for future
research (Uba and Uggla 2011). Our contribution may serve as starting point with a
clear message: Where there is direct democracy, there is less protest.
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See Tables 4 and 5.
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